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UPDATES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL  
AND INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
internatiOnal criMinal cOurt
MaxiMizing the iMpact Of icc 
preliMinary exaMinatiOns
The primary goal of the International 
Criminal Court’s (ICC) preliminary exami-
nations is to determine whether there are 
grounds to launch an official ICC inves-
tigation into a situation. As a basis for the 
decision to open an investigation, prelimi-
nary examinations have the potential to 
further the Court’s overall goals of end-
ing impunity and deterring future crimes. 
To successfully achieve these goals, pre-
liminary examinations require a balanced 
approach. On one hand, the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) must adopt a consistent 
method of analysis that provides sufficient 
information about the investigation to spur 
national proceedings and alert potential 
perpetrators of crimes that they could be 
held accountable. On the other hand, the 
OTP must adapt to a wide variety of cir-
cumstances and cannot provide informa-
tion that would raise expectations about 
the Court’s involvement, compromise due 
process, or risk the safety of victims and 
witnesses. During the first decade of the 
Court’s work, inconsistency among the 
approaches to preliminary examinations, 
especially the absence of clear timelines, 
has limited their effectiveness.
The ICC initiates preliminary examina-
tions in one of three ways: through a deci-
sion of the Prosecutor; through a referral 
from a State Party or the UN Security 
Council; or through a declaration of a non-
State Party pursuant to Article 12(3) of 
the Rome Statute, under which that State 
accepts ICC jurisdiction for the prelimi-
nary examination and consequent proceed-
ings. In all three situations, the Prosecutor 
follows the same procedure to determine 
whether there is a reasonable basis to pro-
ceed with an investigation based on three 
criteria laid out in Article 53(1) of the 
Rome Statute. The Prosecutor must first 
determine whether there is temporal, mate-
rial, and either territorial or personal juris-
diction. Second, the Prosecutor considers 
whether the case would be admissible, 
taking into consideration both the gravity 
of the alleged crimes and whether there 
are already sufficient and ongoing national 
proceedings. Finally, the Prosecutor con-
siders whether ICC proceedings would 
violate the interests of justice.
In practice, however, the timeline of 
preliminary examinations conducted by the 
Prosecutor to date has been inconsistent. 
Without a clear and predetermined time-
line, the Prosecutor has progressed quickly 
through all three Article 53(1) steps in 
some situations, while drawing out his 
analysis in others. In part, these discrepan-
cies are necessary because the time required 
to analyze Article 53(1) factors varies based 
on the circumstances. In evaluating admis-
sibility, the Prosecutor must determine 
whether there are already national pro-
ceedings covering the same crimes and 
individuals that would likely be the focus 
of an ICC investigation. In the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the 
Prosecutor quickly found that no national 
proceedings were ongoing and moved to 
the next phase of his analysis. However, the 
preliminary examination in Colombia con-
tinues because some national proceedings 
are ongoing. Therefore, the Prosecutor must 
evaluate whether the national proceedings 
are genuine and focused on the individuals 
most responsible before moving to the next 
phase in his analysis.
Although certain situations require 
more time to complete all of the Article 
53(1) steps, as preliminary examinations 
in Colombia and other situations are drawn 
out without even a general timeline, they 
become less credible. When the Prosecutor 
quickly decides to open an investigation 
— as in the Kenya situation — without 
making a decision about long-term pre-
liminary examinations — in places like 
Colombia and Afghanistan — it can give 
rise to the impression that the Prosecutor 
has been influenced by non-legal factors. 
Disparate timelines may lead to impres-
sions that the Prosecutor allocates time 
and resources unevenly among preliminary 
examinations, and could be mitigated by 
increasing transparency and establishing 
general timelines.
As preliminary examinations continue 
without a decision, potential perpetrators 
and national authorities may doubt the 
seriousness of the OTP’s investigations. As 
the prospect of an ICC investigation fades, 
there are fewer incentives to comply with 
the ICC’s laws. In this way, prolonged pre-
liminary examinations weaken the Court’s 
ability to deter crimes and encourage 
national proceedings. The lack of even a 
general timeline is difficult for victims and 
affected communities, who have no indica-
tion of how long they must wait for justice, 
or if justice will even come at all.
Preliminary examinations provide a 
potential avenue for the Court to have 
a greater impact outside the courtroom. 
The OTP has taken some positive steps 
by increasing transparency, but the incon-
sistent approach to preliminary examina-
tions has weakened their credibility and 
effectiveness in spurring national proceed-
ings and deterring crimes. By establishing 
clear guidelines, a general timeline, and 
consistently providing updates regarding 
preliminary examinations, the OTP could 
help the ICC achieve its goals of deterring 
crimes and ending impunity without even 
going to trial.
new MechanisMs establisheD 
tO facilitate Merit-baseD icc 
electiOns
At the Tenth Session of the Assembly 
of States Parties (ASP) from December 
12 to 21, 2011, States Parties to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) voted 
in elections resulting in the largest change 
in leadership since the ICC’s first elections 
in 2003. The nominations and elections of 
the Chief Prosecutor and six new judges 
were significant because two new com-
mittees were established to evaluate the 
qualifications of the candidates for those 
posts. Such committees have not been used 
in past elections, and they represent an 
important step toward a more transparent 
and merit-based election process.
At the Ninth Session of the ASP in 2010, 
the ASP established a Search Committee 
to facilitate the nomination and election 
of the next Chief Prosecutor with the goal 
of electing a candidate by consensus. The 
Search Committee received expressions of 
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interest or recommendations to consider 52 
candidates. After reviewing their creden-
tials, the Search Committee interviewed 
eight of the candidates and recommended 
four to the ASP. Following informal con-
sultations among States Parties, Fatou 
Bensouda was selected as the consensus 
candidate on December 1, 2011, and was 
formally elected on December 12, 2011. 
Her nine-year term as Chief Prosecutor 
will begin in June 2012.
The creation of the Search Committee 
was praised for facilitating nominations 
based on merit. Merit-based nominations 
and elections are important to maintain the 
credibility and impartiality of the Court. 
The method of informally submitting 
nominations to a committee also helps 
to avoid practices such as vote trading, 
which threatens the credibility of both 
the Prosecutor and the Court. However, 
some criticized the Search Committee for 
a lack of transparency and access to infor-
mation. The Search Committee was also 
criticized for lack of diversity because only 
five states were represented — one for 
each regional group — and there were no 
requirements for gender diversity.
Nominations for judicial candidates 
also received impartial review intended 
to encourage a merit-based process. The 
Coalition for the International Criminal 
Court (CICC) created an Independent 
Panel composed of experts in international 
law and criminal law to raise awareness 
about the nomination criteria and review 
the qualifications of judicial candidates. 
Unlike the ASP Search Committee for the 
Prosecutor, the Independent Panel did not 
endorse or oppose candidates, but rather 
evaluated their qualifications to deter-
mine whether they met the criteria for 
judges laid out in Article 36 of the Rome 
Statute, the founding treaty of the ICC. 
Article 36 specifies requirements related 
to candidates’ moral character, past expe-
rience, and competence in relevant areas 
of law. Though the ASP has the authority 
to establish an Advisory Committee on 
judicial nominations under Article 36(4)
(c), it has never exercised this authority 
and, as such, the Independent Panel is not 
affiliated with the ASP. In its final report, 
the Independent Panel found that four of 
the nineteen judicial candidates were not 
qualified because they lacked either the 
experience or competence in a certain area 
of law required under Article 36. After fif-
teen rounds of voting from December 12 to 
16, States Parties elected six new judges, 
all of whom the Independent Panel found 
to be qualified.
The Independent Panel received similar 
praise as the ASP Search Committee for its 
role in supporting a merit-based process, 
but faced different challenges and criti-
cisms. One concern was whether and how 
the members of the Independent Panel 
would measure the qualifications of the 
candidates. Some requirements under the 
Rome Statute, such as that the candidate 
possess high moral character, are difficult 
to measure, and there were concerns about 
the panel’s ability to accurately assess such 
intangible qualities. Nevertheless, many 
found the panel members’ extensive expe-
rience in international law and criminal 
law as well as their geographic diversity 
and knowledge of different legal systems 
sufficient to provide expertise to evaluate 
the criteria for judicial candidates.
As a judicial body, the independence 
and impartiality of the ICC are essential 
to its ability to deliver justice for grave 
violations of human rights. Electing court 
officials through a merit-based process 
safeguards the independence of the Court 
by alleviating perceptions of political 
influence that can arise from vote trad-
ing. Therefore, fair and merit-based elec-
tions serve the Court in two ways: first, 
the Court benefits from the leadership of 
the most highly-qualified candidates; and 
second, the Court earns respect and confi-
dence for representatives elected through 
a transparent and merit-based process. 
The Court will reap these benefits as the 
mechanisms established to review the judi-
cial and prosecutorial candidates for this 
election are refined in the future.
Claire Grandison, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, covers the International 
Criminal Court for the Human Rights 
Brief.
aD hOc tribunals
liMiting the expOsure Of 
prOtecteD witnesses in icty 
prOceeDings
On October 31, 2011, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) sentenced Serbian Radical Party 
leader Vojislav Seselj to eighteen months 
incarceration for contempt of court, under 
Rule 77(A)(ii) of the Rules of Evidence 
and Procedure (Rules), for Seselj’s willful 
disclosure of protected witness information 
on his website. In the second of three such 
contempt proceedings related to Seselj’s 
release of protected information, the Trial 
Chamber found that Seselj directly and 
intentionally violated its protective orders. 
This case presents a unique challenge for 
witness protection at the ICTY. Rule 69(C) 
of the Rules requires that a testifying wit-
ness’ identity be revealed to the defense 
prior to trial as a basic tenant of the Article 
21(4)(e) right to cross-examine. Yet when 
an accused individual ignores the ICTY’s 
protective orders and reveals a witness’ 
identity, other witnesses may be reluctant to 
testify. In a case like Seselj, where fears of 
witness intimidation stalled the proceedings 
for over a year in 2010, Rule 69(C) could 
potentially endanger a witness. The Trial 
Chamber noted that “public confidence in 
the effectiveness of its orders and decisions is 
absolutely vital to the success of the work of 
the Tribunal,” and it must ensure that future 
witness protection measures will effectively 
prevent such disclosures, as required by 
Article 20 of the Statute of the Tribunal.
According to Rule 75(B)(i), the 
Chamber may proprio motu institute 
witness protection measures to include 
expunging identifying information from 
public records, allowing testimony via 
image or voice altering devices, or assign-
ing a pseudonym. Further, Rule 69 autho-
rizes protective orders for all informa-
tion used in the proceedings. In Seselj’s 
case, the Chamber issued protective orders 
and pseudonyms for many witnesses, and 
issued a general order to Seselj to refrain 
from disclosing such information. Seselj 
violated the orders of the Trial Chamber 
when he released identifying information 
and reprinted portions of statements made 
by witnesses in confidential submissions, 
which later appeared on his website and 
in a book that sold 10,000 copies. Seselj, 
representing himself, contended that the 
witnesses gave him permission to disclose, 
that exposing information about the reli-
ability of the witnesses was necessary for 
his defense, and that these witnesses did 
not need protective measures.
The Amicus Prosecutor who brought 
the contempt charges also noted that 
Seselj seemed to enjoy the possibility 
that he would be charged with contempt, 
thereby bringing attention to his stated 
goals of derailing the proceedings and 
2
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol19/iss2/9
51
delegitimizing the ICTY. Because of the 
willful nature of Seselj’s disclosures and 
Seselj’s stated intent to “create conditions 
for the next [disclosure]” when the con-
tempt proceedings conclude, the Chamber 
considered the need for a deterrent from 
future disclosures. Seselj’s sentence of 
eighteen months includes these punitive 
considerations.
The ICTY takes considerable steps to 
protect witness’ physical safety through the 
Victims and Witnesses Section, providing 
security and stiff penalties for disclosure of 
protected information. However, such pro-
tective measures do not prevent an accused 
individual from disclosing information as 
Seselj did. Noting this dilemma and the 
inherent difficulty of testifying at a war 
crimes trial, the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe drafted a report on 
witness protection in the Balkans in June 
2010. The report highlighted the plight of 
witnesses in the former Yugoslavia who 
have been murdered, threatened, and had 
their identities revealed by parties intent 
on obstructing justice. Many witnesses are 
reluctant to testify, believing they will be 
marked as traitors for doing so. In light 
of this, the Assembly decried the ICTY’s 
current practice of disclosing the identity 
of anonymous witnesses to the defense 
prior to the trial. In cases where revealing 
the identity of a witness is disproportion-
ate to the risk of harm to that person, the 
Assembly encouraged the ICTY to con-
sider amending the Rules to allow witness 
anonymity to the defense. On method used 
by the European Court of Human Rights is 
to secure a “special advocate,” functioning 
independently of the parties, to analyze 
the evidence, and act as an intermediary 
between the witness and the defense.
Whatever measures of additional wit-
ness protection the ICTY takes to address 
such situations in the future, it faces the 
daunting task of balancing such a measure 
against the Article 21(4)(e) rights of the 
accused “to examine, or have examined, 
the witnesses against him.” In Seselj’s 
case, the law binding those present in 
court from disclosing information did not 
stop him. Given the global audience for 
Internet disclosures, Seselj’s actions likely 
present an area of concern to the tribunal. 
It remains to be seen whether the ICTY 
can or will institute a process for allowing 
anonymous witnesses to testify without 
infringing on the rights of the accused.
JuDgMent suMMaries: internatiOnal 
criMinal  
tribunal fOr rwanDa
the prOsecutOr v. biziMungu,  
et al., trial JuDgMent, case nO. 
ictr-99-50-t
On September 30, 2011, Trial Chamber 
II of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its judgment in 
the case against Casimir Bizimungu, Justin 
Mugenzi, Jérôme-Clément Bicamumpaka, 
and Prosper Mugiraneza, commonly 
referred to as the “Government II” case. 
Each of the four accused held positions in 
the government of Juvenal Habyarimana 
and, following his death, in the interim 
government that ruled Rwanda between 
April and July 1994. During the events 
of the 1994 genocide, Bizimungu served 
as Minister of Health, Mugenzi served 
as Minister of Commerce, Bicamumpaka 
served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and Mugiraneza served as Minister of 
Civil Service. Each was charged with nine 
counts, namely: genocide; conspiracy to 
commit genocide; complicity in geno-
cide; direct and public incitement to com-
mit genocide; murder as a crime against 
humanity; extermination as a crime against 
humanity; rape as a crime against human-
ity; the war crime of violence to life, 
health and physical or mental well-being 
of persons; and outrages upon personal 
dignity as a war crime. The Chamber 
found Mugenzi and Mugiraneza guilty of 
conspiring to commit genocide and direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide, 
but acquitted the two men of all other 
charges. Mugenzi and Mugiraneza were 
both sentenced to thirty years in prison. 
The Chamber acquitted Bizimungu and 
Bicamumpaka of all nine of the charges 
based on a lack of sufficient evidence, and 
ordered their immediate release.
Before turning to the allegations 
against the four accused, the Trial Chamber 
began its judgment by addressing a num-
ber of preliminary challenges raised by 
the Defense. Among these challenges 
were claims submitted by Bicamumpaka, 
Bizimungu, and Mugenzi that their right 
to be tried without undue delay had been 
violated. The trial was among the longest 
at the ICTR, with more than twelve years 
passing between the arrest of the four sus-
pects and the delivery of the verdict. With 
respect to Bicamumpaka’s challenge, the 
Chamber held that it had already dealt with 
the issue in dismissing a similar motion 
brought by the Bicamumpaka Defense 
seeking a stay of proceedings based on a 
claim that the accused’s right to a speedy 
trial had been violated. Similarly, the 
Chamber held that it would not reconsider 
the claims of Bizimungu and Mugenzi that 
their right to trial without undue delay had 
been violated by the amount of time that 
passed between the arrest of the accused 
and the start of trial, as the Chamber had 
dismissed motions raising a similar claim 
brought by each of these accused prior to 
the commencement of trial. Interestingly, 
the Chamber noted that it may reconsider 
previous rulings based, inter alia, on a new 
fact or change in circumstance, but it held 
that the fact that an additional year had 
passed between its rulings on the initial 
Bizimungu and Mugenzi challenges relat-
ing to undue pre-trial delay and the actual 
commencement of trial did not constitute 
a new fact or change in circumstance war-
ranting reconsideration. Thus, the only 
claim relating to undue delay considered 
by the Trial Chamber in its judgment was 
a claim brought by the Mugenzi Defense 
alleging that his right to a speedy trial was 
violated by the length of the trial itself. The 
trial commenced on November 6, 2003 and 
concluded on December 5, 2008, with the 
Chamber sitting in session for 399 days. 
Mugenzi argued that the length of proceed-
ings was a result of “the Tribunal’s failure 
to prioritise this case, as well as numer-
ous adjournments and scheduling failures 
that delayed the proceedings.” However, 
while the Chamber recognized that the 
proceedings had been lengthy and that 
there were “concerns that the conduct of 
the Tribunal, and the increased workload 
of the presiding judges more specifically, 
has contributed to this delay,” a majority 
of the Chamber rejected Mugenzi’s claim, 
finding that the length of the proceed-
ings could primarily be attributed to size 
and complexity of the case. Judge Emile 
Francis Short dissented from this finding, 
holding that the fact that the judgment was 
not delivered until more than three years 
after the close of evidence in the case was 
sufficient to constitute a violation of the 
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accused’s right to trial without undue delay. 
Judge Short would have taken five years 
off the sentences given to Mugenzi and 
Mugiraneza in compensation for the viola-
tion of their rights and held further hear-
ings to determine the appropriate remedy 
for Bizimungu and Bicamumpaka.
Turning to the allegations against the 
accused, the Prosecution argued that each 
of the accused was responsible under both 
Article 6(1) (direct responsibility) and 
Article 6(3) (superior responsibility) of 
the ICTR Statute based on specific events 
that allegedly supported the charges. In 
addition, the Prosecutor argued in its clos-
ing submissions that each of the four 
accused bore superior responsibility “for 
the genocide as a whole,” claiming that 
that the government ministers were “crimi-
nally liable for the acts perpetrated by 
a range of subordinates, including: the 
staff of their respective ministries, the 
[Forces Armées Rwandaises], the gendar-
merie, soldiers, prefects, prefects’ subor-
dinates, bourgmestres, communal police, 
conseillers, local authorities, civic leaders, 
militias, Interahamwe, ‘the killers’, civil-
ians and ‘the Hutu population through-
out Rwanda.’” Notably, the Tribunal has 
previously held that “general statements 
of the situation in Rwanda in April 1994 
may be illustrative as to the background 
of the case, but they are not suited to 
prove the individual guilt of the Accused.” 
Nevertheless, the Prosecutor asked the 
Chamber to “break new ground” by find-
ing that an accused’s “charismatic power 
over [a] population based on the his-
tory and sociological make-up of that 
community” can satisfy the requirement 
of a superior-subordinate relationship. 
Specifically, in this case, the Prosecutor 
argued that the Chamber should consider 
“the manner in which [the Accused] were 
perceived by society as Ministers, and the 
power of influence they commanded” in 
determining whether they had a superior 
relationship over the various groups of per-
sons responsible for carrying out genocidal 
acts throughout the country. However, the 
Trial Chamber rejected this allegation, 
noting that the Prosecution did not “link 
its theory to any specific, proven events 
in this case,” but rather presented “vague 
arguments” and evidence that was “general 
in nature,” which the Chamber determined 
to be “wholly insufficient to establish the 
rigorous requirements necessary to impose 
criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 
6 (3) of the Statute.”
In terms of the charges upon which 
Mugenzi and Mugiraneza were convicted, 
both related to the role of the two accused 
in the removal of the Tutsi prefect of Butare 
prefecture, Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana, 
on April 17, 1994, and his replacement 
two days later. First, the Chamber deter-
mined that, at least as early as April 
17, a joint criminal enterprise existed 
among several members of the Rwandan 
interim government, including Mugenzi, 
Mugiraneza, and Rwandan President 
Théodore Sindikubwabo, the aim of which 
was to kill Tutsis in Butare. In furtherance 
of this plan, the members of the enterprise 
agreed to remove Habyarimana from his 
post “in order to undermine the real and 
symbolic resistance that he posed to the 
killing of Tutsis in Butare.” According 
to the Chamber, the decision to remove 
Habyarimana amounted to an agreement 
to undertake a preparatory act that, while 
preceding the physical perpetration of 
genocide, was “clearly aimed at” further-
ing genocide. Furthermore, the Chamber 
determined that both Mugenzi and 
Mugiraneza “possessed genocidal intent 
when agreeing to remove Habyarimana.” 
Thus, the Chamber held, Mugenzi and 
Mugiraneza were guilty of conspiracy to 
commit genocide. Second, the Chamber 
determined that, two days after the 
removal of Habyarimana, President 
Sindikubwabo delivered an inflamma-
tory speech at the ceremony inaugurating 
Habyarimana’s replacement that amounted 
to direct and public incitement to geno-
cide. Specifically, the Chamber deter-
mined that Sindikubwabo’s speech “was 
a direct call for those in Butare to engage 
in the killing of Tutsi civilians,” delivered 
to a public audience, and that he made 
his remarks with genocidal intent. The 
Chamber then concluded that the speech 
was made “in furtherance of the criminal 
purpose” of the joint criminal enterprise 
to kill Tutsis in Butare. The Chamber 
found that Mugenzi and Mugiraneza 
shared President Sindikubwabo’s geno-
cidal intent, as demonstrated by their 
involvement in the decision to remove 
Habyarimana and their presence at the 
inaugural ceremony on April 19. Finally, 
the Chamber concluded that Mugenzi 
and Mugiraneza “substantially and sig-
nificantly contributed” to Sindikubwabo’s 
incitement by “creat[ing] a scenario that 
would allow for Sindikubwabo to publicly 
and ceremoniously air his inflammatory 
speech,” fostering a “context that would 
ensure that Sindikubwabo’s inciting mes-
sage would be understood,” and providing 
“significant and substantial moral encour-
agement to Sindikubwabo as he incited the 
killing of Tutsis.” Therefore, the Chamber 
concluded that Mugenzi and Mugiraneza 
were guilty of direct and public incite-
ment to commit genocide based on their 
participation in a joint criminal enterprise. 
Based on these convictions, and taking 
into account the gravity of the crimes and 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
the Trial Chamber sentenced Mugenzi and 
Mugiraneza to thirty years in prison.
Sofia Vivero, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this judgment summary 
for the Human Rights Brief. Katherine 
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War 
Crimes Research Office, edited this sum-
mary for the Human Rights Brief.
yussuf MunyaKazi v. the 
prOsecutOr, appeals JuDgMent, 
case nO. ictr-97-36a-a
On September 28, 2011, the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued 
its judgment in the case against Yussuf 
Munyakazi. The Trial Chamber convicted 
Munyakazi for committing genocide and 
extermination as a crime against human-
ity based on his participation in attacks 
on the parishes of Shangi and Mibilizi in 
April 1994, which resulted in the deaths 
of more than 5,000 Tutsi civilians. He was 
sentenced to a single term of twenty-five 
years of imprisonment. In its opinion, 
the Appeals Chamber dismissed each of 
Munyakazi’s eight grounds of appeal, as 
well as the Prosecutor’s three grounds of 
appeal, and confirmed the Trial Chamber’s 
judgment and sentence.
As a general matter, questions pertain-
ing to the assessment of evidence played 
a significant part in the Chamber’s judg-
ment. When addressing alleged errors in 
the assessment of evidence, the Appeals 
Chamber stressed that the Trial Chamber is 
endowed with broad discretion to evaluate 
inconsistencies arising within or among 
witnesses’ testimonies and to consider 
whether the evidence is credible taken as 
a whole. Furthermore, when evaluating 
inconsistent accounts, the Trial Chamber 
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retains discretion to express a preference 
for, and rely on, what it determines to 
be the most credible testimony, or piece 
of testimony. The Appeals Chamber also 
recalled that, consistent with its prior juris-
prudence, the Trial Chamber may find that 
one witness’s testimony has been satisfac-
torily corroborated by the testimony of a 
second witness, even where some discrep-
ancies exist between the two testimonies. 
Thus, for instance, the Appeals Chamber 
found no error in the Trial Chamber’s deci-
sion to discount minor variances between 
the testimony of two witnesses, such as the 
gender of certain militia members, noting 
that such discrepancies are not unexpected 
in the given context, particularly due to the 
witnesses’ varying vantage points. The fact 
that the testimonies were consistent on key 
details, such as the date and timeframe of 
the attack, Munyakazi’s participation, and 
the general tenor of the events, was deemed 
sufficient to support the Chamber’s finding 
that the witnesses were credible.
Among Munyakazi’s unsuccessful 
grounds of appeal was a claim that the Trial 
Chamber erred in its assessment of his 
alibi. Specifically, Munyakazi argued that: 
(i) the Chamber inappropriately considered 
the fact that Munyakazi did not provide 
notice of his intent to rely on an alibi in 
assessing the reliability of the alibi; and 
(ii) the Chamber improperly reversed the 
burden of proof by faulting the Defense for 
adducing no evidence to support the alibi 
other than the testimony of the accused, 
which the Chamber found to be unreli-
able. As to the first issue, the Appeals 
Chamber first recalled that Rule 67(A)(ii)
(a) of the ICTR’s Rules of Evidence and 
Procedure requires the Defense to notify 
the Prosecution before the commencement 
of trial of its intent to enter a defense of 
alibi. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber 
recalled its earlier jurisprudence in which 
it held that the Trial Chamber may con-
sider the circumstances in which an alibi 
was presented in weighing its credibility. 
Thus, the Appeals Chamber found no 
error in the Trial Chamber’s holding that, 
while the Defense’s failure to provide 
advance notice of its alibi was not “dis-
positive,” the lack of notice, and indeed 
the fact that the alibi was not presented 
until Munyakazi took the stand as the final 
witness for the Defense, affected the cred-
ibility of the alibi. On the second issue, the 
Appeals Chamber began by reiterating that 
the accused does not bear the burden of 
proving an alibi beyond a reasonable doubt; 
rather, when the defense of alibi is raised, 
the Prosecution must establish the allega-
tions against the accused beyond a reason-
able doubt despite the alibi. Nevertheless, 
the Appeals Chamber noted that the Trial 
Chamber has the right to require corrobo-
ration of any evidence, and held that, in 
this case, “ it was not unreasonable for the 
Trial Chamber to question the credibility 
of Munyakazi’s alibi in the absence of cor-
roboration given the inherent self-interest 
of his testimony and the introduction of the 
alibi at the close of the case.”
The Defense also challenged the 
validity of the Trial Chamber’s finding 
that Munyakazi was responsible for the 
attacks at the Shangi and Mibilzi par-
ishes based on his role as a “leader of the 
attacks who exercised de facto author-
ity over the Bugarama Interahamwe” that 
physically carried out the attacks. In par-
ticular, Munyakazi challenged the Trial 
Chamber’s finding that he had sufficient 
notice that the Prosecution was alleging he 
held a leadership role during the attacks. 
In reviewing the indictment, the Appeals 
Chamber noted that paragraph 1 alleged 
that, during the entire period covered by 
the indictment, Munyakazi was “a leader 
with de facto authority over the Bugarama 
MRND Interahamwe militia,” and that 
paragraphs 13 and 14 Munyakazi, “with 
the Bugarama Interahamwe, attacked and 
killed” Tutsi civilians at the two parishes. 
However, there was no specific allegation 
supporting the Trial Chamber’s ultimate 
finding that Munyakazi committed the 
crimes at Shangi and Mibilizi parishes 
“[o]n the basis of his leadership posi-
tion at the crime sites.” Nevertheless, the 
Appeals Chamber determined that the 
“more general allegations” in paragraphs 
13 and 14 must be read “in light of para-
graph 1,” which alleges Munyakazi’s role 
as the leader over the Interahamwe, and 
that therefore, the indictment provided 
the accused with sufficient notice that he 
could be held responsible for the attacks 
on the parishes based on his leadership role 
over the militia members that carried out 
the attacks. Munyakazi also challenged the 
Trial Chamber’s assessment of the evidence 
presented in support of the Prosecution’s 
claim that Munyakazi acted as a leader 
over those who carried out the attacks on 
the Shangi and Mibilizi parishes, but the 
Appeals Chamber dismissed this challenge, 
relying on the principles described above 
relating to the Trial Chamber’s discretion in 
assessing evidence.
Yet another challenge brought by 
Munyakazi was that the Trial Chamber 
erred in finding that he acted with the 
requisite intent to convict him of geno-
cide and the crime against humanity of 
extermination. According to Munyakazi, 
the Chamber had no legal or factual basis 
for its findings of intent, and the Chamber 
erred by failing to find that Munyakazi 
had formed the intent to commit genocide 
prior to the occurrence of the attacks. In its 
judgment, the Trial Chamber recognized 
that it “had very little direct evidence of 
Munyakazi’s intent” with regard to the 
acts carried out at the parishes and “no 
evidence of his personal views regarding 
Tutsis.” However, citing to Munyakazi’s 
statement to the Tutsi refugees at Mibilizi 
parish that they “were going to pay” for 
killing the head of state, and stressing the 
“nature and scope of the crimes” commit-
ted at both parishes, the Trial Chamber 
inferred that Munyakazi acted with the 
requisite genocidal intent and with knowl-
edge that the attacks formed part of a 
widespread and systematic attack on Tutsi 
civilians. The Appeals Chamber found no 
error in the Trial Chamber’s approach, 
noting that an accused’s genocidal intent 
“may be inferred from circumstantial evi-
dence, including his active participation 
in an attack.” In fact, despite Munyakazi’s 
argument to the contrary, the Appeals 
Chamber reiterated earlier jurisprudence 
holding that “[t]he inquiry is not whether 
the specific intent was formed prior to the 
commission of the acts, but whether at the 
moment of commission the perpetrators 
possessed the necessary intent.”
Lastly, the Appeals Chamber dismissed 
Munyakazi’s challenge to his sentence, 
upholding the Trial Chamber’s finding that 
the abuse of a position of influence and 
authority in a given case may be counted 
as an aggravating factor in sentencing 
and deferring to the Trial Chamber’s 
broad discretion to dismiss or to take into 
account mitigating circumstances raised 
by the Defense. Furthermore, the Appeals 
Chamber held that the fact that Trial 
Chamber did not expressly discuss some 
mitigating circumstances raised by the 
Defense, namely that Munyakazi provided 
assistance to several Tutsi friends during 
the genocide, is not relevant because a 
Trial Chamber is not required to expressly 
address every piece of presented evidence, 
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and moreover possesses broad discretion 
to determine the weight of such evidence. 
The Appeals Chamber also rejected the 
Prosecution’s request that the sentence be 
increased to life imprisonment, and thus 
affirmed the Trial Chamber’s sentence of 
twenty-five years imprisonment.
Interestingly, Judge Liu attached a 
separate opinion to the judgment in which 
he discusses the Trial Chamber’s holding 
that Munyakazi’s role in the attacks on 
the two parishes amounted to “commis-
sion” of the charged crimes under Article 
6(1) of the ICTR Statute, a holding that 
was not challenged on appeal. As Judge 
Liu recognized, the ICTR first adopted an 
expanded interpretation of “commission” 
as a mode of liability in the Gacumbitsi 
case, in which the Appeals Chamber held 
that, in the context of genocide, a person 
need not physically perpetrate the actus 
reus or participate in a joint criminal 
enterprise aimed at carrying out genocide 
to be held responsible for “committing” 
genocide, but rather may be found to 
have “committed” the crime by performing 
other acts, such as directing or supervis-
ing killings. This expanded understanding 
of “committing” was later applied to the 
crime against humanity of extermination. 
While Judge Liu acknowledged that this 
interpretation could now be considered 
settled jurisprudence of the Tribunal, he 
nevertheless wrote to express concern that, 
by subsuming and conflating the various 
modes of individual criminal responsibil-
ity outlined in Article 6(1) of the Statute — 
namely, committing, planning, ordering, 
instigating, and otherwise aiding and abet-
ting — the expanded definition “creates 
considerable ambiguity as to the scope of 
a convicted person’s criminal responsibil-
ity,” which in turn may “run contrary to 
basic principles of fairness.” Judge Liu 
also noted that the broad interpretation of 
“committing” “uncannily resembles joint 
criminal enterprise, without requiring the 
satisfaction of [the latter’s] more stringent 
pleading criteria.”
Andra Nicolescu, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this judgment summary 
for the Human Rights Brief. Katherine 
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War 
Crimes Research Office, edited this sum-
mary for the Human Rights Brief.
ephreM setaKO v. the prOsecutOr, 
appeals JuDgMent, case nO. 
ictr-04-81-a
On September 28, 2011 the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its 
judgment in the case against Ephrem 
Setako, who served as head of the legal 
affairs division of the Rwandan Ministry 
of Defence during the 1994 genocide. 
At trial, all of the charges against Setako 
related to his alleged role in ordering 
the killing of Tutsis at the Mukamira 
military camp on two separate occasions, 
namely on April 25, 1994 and on May 11, 
1994. The Trial Chamber of the ICTR had 
sentenced Setako to twenty-five years of 
imprisonment upon convictions for geno-
cide in relation to both sets of killings; 
extermination as a crime against humanity 
in relation to the April 25 killings; and 
violence to life, health and physical or 
mental well-being of persons (murder) as 
a serious violation of Article 3 common to 
the Geneva Conventions and of Additional 
Protocol II in relation to the April 25 kill-
ings. On appeal, the Appeals Chamber 
affirmed the Trial Chamber’s judgment, 
and convicted Setako of an additional 
count of murder in violation of Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions based on the 
May 11 killings. Despite the additional 
conviction, however, the Chamber did 
not increase the original twenty-five year 
sentence imposed on Setako.
Setako raised several unsuccessful 
grounds of appeal, including a claim that 
he had been denied a right to a fair 
trial. Specifically, Setako challenged the 
fact that the Trial Chamber granted the 
Prosecutor leave to amend the indictment 
more than three years after the initial 
indictment had been issued, claiming that 
the amended indictment significantly 
expanded the case against the accused 
and thus deprived him of his rights to be 
tried without undue delay and to have 
adequate time and facilities to prepare his 
defense. In response, the Appeals Chamber 
began by recalling that the Trial Chamber 
enjoys considerable discretion in determin-
ing the conduct of trial proceedings, which 
includes determining whether to grant the 
Prosecutor leave to amend an indictment. 
While the Trial Chamber must safeguard 
the accused’s right to a fair and expedi-
tious trial, a discretionary decision of the 
Chamber will not be overturned on appeal 
unless the challenging party demonstrates 
a discernible error resulting in prejudice to 
that party. Here, the Appeals Chamber held 
that Setako failed to make such a demon-
stration, particularly in light of the fact 
that the Trial Chamber did not grant the 
Prosecution’s request for leave to amend 
the indictment in its entirety. Indeed, the 
Trial Chamber rejected several proposed 
amendments on the ground that they would 
give the Prosecution an “unfair tactical 
advantage” given the late stage of the pro-
ceedings. Instead, the Trial Chamber only 
permitted those amendments that would 
enhance the fairness of the trial, such as 
those aimed at “better articulating [the 
Prosecution’s] theories of criminal respon-
sibility, removing any factual allegations it 
no longer wishes to pursue, and correcting 
or supplementing with additional detail 
any of the existing factual allegations.”
Another of Setako’s unsuccessful 
grounds of appeal was a claim that the 
Trail Chamber erred in finding two of the 
Prosecution’s witnesses, who were “insider 
witnesses,” credible. Setako raised a num-
ber of challenges to the credibility of the 
witnesses, including the fact that, prior to 
being investigated by ICTR authorities, 
the witnesses had both provided confes-
sions to Rwandan national authorities in 
which they made no mention of the crimes 
in which they later implicated Setako. 
Setako argued that the Trial Chamber failed 
to adequately explain these omissions, cit-
ing to Rwandan Organic Law 8/96, which 
requires that a person making a confession 
to Rwandan judicial authorities provide 
information about all of the suspect’s crimes 
and co-perpetrators. The Appeals Chamber 
began its assessment of Setako’s claim by 
noting that the credibility of a witness will 
depend on a variety of factors and must 
be evaluated in the context of all of the 
evidence on the record. In the present case, 
the Appeals Chamber determined that the 
Trial Chamber “reasonably considered” all 
of the relevant factors, including the fact 
that neither of the two witnesses had been 
charged by Rwandan authorities with the 
particular crimes in which they later impli-
cated Setako, making it unlikely that they 
would voluntarily inform those authorities 
that they had in fact participated in the 
crimes. With regard to Rwandan Organic 
Law 8/96, the Appeals Chamber noted that 
Setako had not raised this law before the 
Trial Chamber, but rather cited to it for the 
first time on appeal, and thus the Defense 
could not fault the Trial Chamber for 
6
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol19/iss2/9
55
failing to address the law in its assessment 
of the witnesses’ credibility.
One ground of appeal raised by Setako 
that was successful involved a challenge to 
the Trial Chamber’s decision to take judi-
cial notice of a certain fact determined by 
the Trial Chamber in the Bagosora, et al. 
trial, a case that was on appeal at the time 
of the Setako Trial Chamber’s judgment. 
Pursuant to Rule 94(B) of the ICTR’s 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, a Trial 
Chamber may “decide to take judicial 
notice of adjudicated facts or documentary 
evidence from other proceedings of the 
Tribunal relating to the matter at issue in 
the current proceedings.” However, Rule 
94(B) expressly requires that the Trial 
Chamber take judicial notice of a fact or 
evidence from other proceedings only “after 
hearing the parties.” Furthermore, as estab-
lished in prior jurisprudence of the ICTR, 
the reference to “adjudicated” facts in Rule 
94(B) means that the relevant fact must have 
been determined in a final judgment. Here, 
the Appeals Chamber determined that the 
Trial Chamber erred by judicially noticing a 
fact from the Bagosora, et al. Trial Chamber 
judgment without hearing from the parties 
and while the judgment was pending appeal. 
Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber deter-
mined that the fact that was judicially noticed 
was otherwise supported by documentary 
evidence entered into the record during 
Setako’s trial, and thus did not invalidate the 
conclusions of the Trial Chamber.
Among the grounds of appeal raised 
by the Prosecutor was a challenge to the 
Trial Chamber’s failure to convict Setako 
of the war crime of murder in relation 
to a number of killings that occurred on 
May 11, 1994 at the Mukamira military 
camp. Notably, the Trial Chamber had 
determined that Setako was responsible 
for these killings in support of its find-
ing that Setako was guilty of genocide, 
but the Chamber made no finding with 
respect to the Prosecution’s allegation that 
these killings also amounted to murder as 
a war crime. After reiterating its earlier 
dismissal of Setako’s challenge to the Trial 
Chamber’s finding that he ordered the 
May 11 killings, and determining that the 
victims of the killings could not be consid-
ered to have been taking an active part in 
hostilities at the time of their murder, the 
Appeals Chamber, by majority, held that 
Setako was in fact guilty of murder as a 
war crime based on the incident. While 
Judge Pocar agreed with the majority that 
the Trial Chamber erred by failing to con-
vict Setako of the charge, he nevertheless 
dissented from the majority’s holding on 
the ground that he does not believe that 
the Appeals Chamber has the authority to 
enter a new conviction on appeal. As he 
has argued in dissenting opinions issued in 
previous cases, Judge Pocar stressed that 
Article 24(2) of the ICTR Statute requires 
that the Chamber apply fundamental prin-
ciples of international human rights law, 
including those found in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
1966 (ICCPR). Because Article 14(5) of 
the ICCPR states that “[e]veryone con-
victed of a crime shall have the right to his 
conviction and sentence being reviewed by 
a higher tribunal according to law,” Judge 
Pocar argued that an accused must have a 
right to appeal any conviction entered by 
the Tribunal, a right that is denied when the 
Appeals Chamber enters a new conviction 
on appeal. In Judge Pocar’s opinion, the 
Appeals Chamber should have either found 
that the Trial Chamber erred in relation to 
the charge of murder as a war crime and 
remitted the case to the Trial Chamber to 
rectify the error, or simply entered its find-
ing regarding the Trial Chamber’s error in 
order to correct the record, but decline to 
remit the case to the Trial Chamber in light 
of efficiency concerns. The latter approach 
might be particularly warranted in the 
present case, in Judge Pocar’s opinion, 
given that the Appeals Chamber deter-
mined that the additional conviction did 
not affect the accused’s sentence.
The Prosecution also contended on 
appeal that the Trial Chamber erred when 
it did not address the defendant’s respon-
sibility for the charged crimes under both 
Article 6(1) (direct responsibility) and 
Article 6(3) (superior responsibility) of the 
Statute. Specifically, the Trial Chamber 
determined that, because it found that 
Setako was guilty under Article 6(1) of the 
Statute, it did not need to address Setako’s 
liability under Article 6(3), holding that 
Setako could not be convicted under both 
provisions based on the same set of facts. 
While the Appeals Chamber affirmed that 
the Trial Chamber could not enter separate 
convictions against Setako on the basis 
of more than one theory of liability, it 
held that the Trial Chamber should have 
considered whether Setako bore respon-
sibility under Article 6(3) for purposes of 
sentencing. The Appeals Chamber went 
on to make the determination itself and 
held that the Prosecution had failed to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Setako exercised effective control over the 
individuals who carried out the killings at 
the Mukamira military camp, and thus held 
that he did not bear superior responsibility 
for the charged crimes.
Finally, the Appeals Chamber addressed 
the appropriateness of the Trial Chamber’s 
sentence, holding that although the Appeals 
Chamber had entered an additional convic-
tion against Setako for murder as a war 
crime, this finding did not warrant an 
increase in Setako’s sentence because the 
Trial Chamber had “decided on Setako’s 
sentence based on a full picture of the 
proven material allegations against him.”
Danielle Dean, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this judgment summary 
for the Human Rights Brief. Katherine 
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War 
Crimes Research Office, edited this sum-
mary for the Human Rights Brief.
nO refuge: the quanDary Of 
resettling suspects acquitteD 
by the ictr
The International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) rendered judgment in 
the high profile “Government II” case on 
September 30, 2011, and with it brought 
a persistently pressing matter back to 
the fore: what should the international 
community do with persons acquitted by 
the ICTR? In “Government II,” the ICTR 
tried four former ministers of the interim 
government established in Rwanda after 
the assassination of President Juvénal 
Habyarimana. Two of the four were acquit-
ted for lack of sufficient proof of involve-
ment. Returning to Rwanda is an unlikely 
option for these men because of their high 
profiles and the possibility of persecu-
tion, and they will have to go through 
the difficult process of seeking resettle-
ment in another country. The ICTR has 
acquitted ten accused persons, and only 
five have managed to find a host coun-
try. André Ntagerura has unsuccessfully 
sought a host country since his acquittal in 
2004. The plight of Ntagerura and others 
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demonstrates the need for the international 
community to put its weight behind the 
tribunal’s verdicts and treat the resettle-
ment of persons acquitted by international 
tribunals as a contemporaneous duty to the 
establishment of the ad hoc tribunals.
Outgoing ICTR President Judge 
Khalida Rachid Khan sees the resettlement 
of persons acquitted by the tribunal as a 
“fundamental expression of the Rule of 
Law,” guaranteeing acquitted individuals 
the right to live, including full enjoyment 
of education, employment, and family. 
Judge Khan has repeatedly implored the 
UN Security Council to aid in finding a 
suitable solution to the problem of resettle-
ment. In a 2008 report highlighting reloca-
tion challenges, the ICTR noted that the 
effectiveness of ad hoc tribunals will be 
seriously challenged if member states do 
not demonstrate support in such efforts.
Public response in Rwanda to the acquit-
tal of high profile individuals “convicted” in 
the court of public opinion is typically not 
positive. Thus, acquitted persons reside in 
temporary safe houses in Arusha, Tanzania. 
Many UN member states have the ability 
to provide a safe alternative, and several 
have, but the majority show reluctance to 
work with the ICTR. This is due, in part, to 
the lack of any formal mechanism for such 
relocations. Article 28 of the ICTR Statute 
governs cooperation with member states, 
but focuses primarily on the identification, 
testimony, service, arrest, detention, and 
transfer of suspects to the ICTR, and does 
not mandate cooperation with requests for 
the resettlement of acquitted persons. The 
ICTR has thus relied on its registrar to coor-
dinate these relocations, with mixed success 
after protracted bilateral negotiations. So far 
France has accepted two acquitted persons, 
while Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy have 
each accepted one.
In the past, the United Nations High 
Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) 
has expressed reservations about granting 
refugee status to acquitted persons, point-
ing to Article 1(F) of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention that prohibits refugee status if 
“there are serious reasons for considering 
that...[one] has committed a crime against 
peace, a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity….” However, the UNHCR notes 
that because acquitted persons fear persecu-
tion in Rwanda as a result of their acquittal, 
they require refugee status. Furthermore, 
an acquittal by an ad hoc tribunal may 
effectively remove the “serious reasons for 
concern” mentioned in Article 1(F). Yet 
refugee or not, the problem of finding a 
country to accept the acquitted persons still 
remains.
In June 2011, outgoing ICTR President 
Khan, with the support of the UNHCR, 
appealed to the UN Security Council to 
form a solution. The Security Council 
responded positively to President Khan’s 
request, adopting Resolution 2029 on 
December 21, 2011, requesting that mem-
ber states “cooperate with and render all 
necessary assistance to the International 
Tribunal in the relocation of acquitted 
persons.” Under Article 25 of the Charter 
of the United Nations, member states must 
“agree to accept and carry out” decisions 
of the Security Council, and such decisions 
are binding when made under Chapter VII 
of the Charter, as was Resolution 2029. 
It is now up to the member states and the 
ICTR to build a formal mechanism. Five 
acquitted persons remain in Arusha under 
the protection of the ICTR, and unless 
a solution appears soon, the Residual 
Mechanism will inherit the challenge of 
finding host countries when it takes over 
for the ICTR in July 2012.
Benjamin Watson, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, covers the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals for the Human Rights Brief.
internatiOnalizeD tribunals
prisOners Of the special cOurt fOr 
sierra leOne allege MistreatMent 
in rwanDa prisOn
Despite complaints of mistreatment from 
the prisoners themselves, the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (SCSL) recently found that 
the eight men currently serving sentences 
in Rwanda for crimes against humanity are 
being treated fairly and according to inter-
national standards. The SCSL was estab-
lished in July 2002 to adjudicate war crimes 
and crimes against humanity committed 
during the civil war in Sierra Leone. The 
Appeal Chamber sentenced Allieu Kondewa 
and Moinina Fofana in 2008 and RUF 
leaders Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, 
and Augustine Gbao in 2009, to prison 
sentences in Rwanda. Following custom-
ary international standards and complaint 
review, Rule 39 of the Rules of Detention 
for the SCSL entitles detainees to medical 
services, adequate food, family visits, and 
the right to complain about conditions to the 
Chief of Detention and the Registrar of the 
SCSL. Although the prisoners have alleged 
that they did not receive proper nutrition 
or medical attention, a committee from the 
SCSL did not find sufficient evidence to 
warrant transfer to another country.
The SCSL does not have the capac-
ity to house detainees after they have 
been convicted, and has therefore made 
agreements with Finland, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, and Rwanda for pris-
oners to serve their sentences in those 
countries. Having been convicted by the 
SCSL, the prisoners are subject to the 
SCSL Rules of Detention while they serve 
their sentences in the host country. The 
Amended Agreement between the SCSL 
and the Government of Rwanda states 
that the “conditions of imprisonment shall 
be consistent with the widely accepted 
international standards governing treat-
ment of prisoners,” and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
will inspect the conditions of detention 
to ensure that standards are being met. 
International standards require that the 
dignity of personhood of all detainees be 
respected and that all basic needs, such as 
health, security and privacy are met in a 
reasonable fashion. These needs are judged 
in part by medical officers who advice the 
Chief of Detention.
Under the Practice Direction for 
Designation of State for Enforcement of 
Sentence, once the SCSL has finalized a 
sentence, the President of the Court decides 
where the convict is sent. Rwanda’s com-
mitment to take convicted persons from the 
SCSL became part of Rwandan law, which 
requires that the detention centers maintain 
a standard comparable to the requirements 
of the SCSL. However, prison conditions 
throughout Rwanda have historically been 
criticized, due to concerns of overcrowding, 
poor medical care, and physical. Because 
Rwandan law requires less stringent prison 
conditions, there is concern that the pris-
oners of the SCSL in Rwanda are being 
denied their rights to adequate standards 
of detention under the SCSL Rules of 
Detention and customary international 
law. However, the Commissioner General 
of Rwandan Correctional Services stated 
that the SCSL prisoners are given special 
treatment in Rwandan prisons and after 
a committee from the SCSL visited the 
prison in Rwanda and reported back to the 
court, the SCSL stated that the prisoners 
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were being treated in accordance with 
international standards.
Based on the report issued by the SCSL 
in January 2012, it seems unlikely that 
the prisoners will be removed to another 
country. Given the difference in prison 
conditions between Rwanda and prisons in 
Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 
it is understandable that the prisoners 
would want to be transferred to one of 
the European countries known for better 
health care and more humane prison con-
ditions. Furthermore, the prisoners’ wives 
could seek asylum in the European host 
country under European asylum laws to 
be near their husbands. While the SCSL 
prisoners’ complaints may put a spotlight 
on the Rwandan prison system, allegations 
of overcrowding and human rights abuses 
have long plagued the Rwandan prison 
system. However, with the SCSL report 
stating no findings of abuse, it is unlikely 
that the prisoners will be moved to Europe.
Prisoners’ rights are an important 
aspect of international justice because the 
humane treatment of detainees and con-
victs legitimizes an international court’s 
ability to adjudicate human rights abuses. 
However, determining what constitutes 
fair treatment is challenging when prison 
conditions among different countries vary 
widely. As the SCSL has agreements with 
both European and African nations to host 
prisoners, prisoners understandably prefer 
sentences in European countries with bet-
ter prison facilities. However, there is a 
limited amount the SCSL can do without 
clear evidence of prisoner abuse and viola-
tions of international standards.
trials in absentia in the special 
tribunal fOr lebanOn
For the first time since the Nuremburg 
trial in abstentia of Martin Bormann in 
1946, an internationalized court, namely 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), 
has initiated a trial completely in absten-
tia. In the case of The Prosecutor v. Salim 
Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, 
Hussein Hassan Oneissi, and Assad 
Hassan Sabra, the pre-trial court seized the 
trial chamber and determined that a trial in 
abstentia is appropriate at this time. The 
defendants were indicted in June 2011, 
but as of February 2012, none of the four 
accused of assassinating former Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri had appeared 
before the court. Because trials in absentia 
are a controversial concept, as the STL 
begins its proceedings, it will have to bal-
ance the need for efficient justice with the 
rights of the accused for a fair trial under 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 14(3)(d).
Trials in absentia are controversial 
because they seem to violate the due pro-
cess rights guaranteed in Article 14(3)(d) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which ensures the right of 
a defendant “to be tried in his presence.” 
Despite this discord with the ICCPR, 
many countries, such as the United States, 
France and Italy, allow for partial trials in 
abstentia if the accused is aware of and 
present for the initial hearing of the trial. 
The validity of a trial in abstentia rests on 
the guarantee that the defendant has the 
same rights during the trial as if he were 
present, and that he is made aware of the 
initial proceedings and indictment. The 
European Court of Human Rights allows 
trials in absentia provided that a retrial is 
permitted if the defendant chooses, except 
if the defendant waived his right to be pres-
ent and had his chosen counsel appear on 
his behalf.
Unlike in the United States, the STL 
can hold trials completely in absentia 
under Article 22 of the Statute of the STL 
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
105 and 106. A trial in abstentia shall be 
conducted in the STL if the defendant has 
waived his right to be present, has not been 
handed over to the STL, or has absconded 
and the court has taken all “reasonable 
precautions” such as coordinating with 
Lebanese authorities. Rule 105 bis (A) 
allows the pre-trial court to initiate a trial 
in abstentia if the defendants have not 
communicated with the court thirty days 
after the indictment.
The STL issued the indictment in 
Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash, et al. 
on June 28, 2011. Despite arrest warrants 
being issued on July 8, 2011, the defen-
dants failed to appear before the court. 
In September, the pre-trial court initi-
ated proceedings to seize the trial court 
to determine if a trial in absentia could 
proceed. However, the prosecution filed a 
motion that was granted requesting a delay 
in the proceedings because all reasonable 
measures to secure the defendants under 
Rule 106 have not been completed. The 
prosecution cited a lack of cooperation 
between the trial court and the Lebanese 
authorities who could do more to search 
for and arrest the defendants. However, 
on February 1, 2012, the Trial Chamber 
ordered the commencement of a trial in 
absentia against the four accused to start 
this year. If the four accused are found 
guilty, they may accept the verdict of the 
trial in absentia, accept the verdict and 
request a hearing on some aspect of the 
case, or request a new trial.
While in theory an apolitical tribunal, 
the STL is in a tenuous position given 
the current political situation in Lebanon. 
As the three-year mandate of the tribunal 
draws to a close and Hezbollah gains 
political support throughout the country, 
in part by promising to defund the STL, 
issuing a ruling to authorize a trial in 
absentia may add fuel to the fire and cre-
ate increased resentment against the tri-
bunal. Furthermore, the validity of a trial 
in absentia must be questioned. While the 
indictments of the four accused have been 
published throughout Lebanon and the 
world, it is possible that the suspects are so 
well hidden that they have not heard of the 
indictments, in which case commencing 
with a trial against them could violate their 
rights under the ICCPR. On the other hand, 
if the TIMES article is true, the rights 
of the victims to have their day in court 
against the accused should not be denied 
simply because the controlling political 
party in Lebanon wishes to avoid it. In the 
end, effective international justice should 
rise above the political concerns of a state.
Michelle Flash, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the Internationalized 
Tribunals for the Human Rights Brief.
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